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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Firms generally operate in a complex economic enviro ment where they interact with a broad 
base of stakeholders: investors, employees, customers, suppliers. These stakeholders are interested 
in the economic environment of the firm and its prospects as this determines the value of their 
monetary and non-monetary claims. The stakeholders rely for their valuation on a wide range of 
sources for information. These sources are per definition a depiction of the firm and its economic 
environment. Because of importance of the stakeholdrs, managers have incentives to try to affect 
their assessment of the firm. As firms might make opportunistic decisions for their disclosures, 
these might not be informative about the prospects of the firm from the stakeholders’ perspective. 
The quality of the different sources is therefore defined by their usefulness for the stakeholders 
while valuing their respective claim. Financial accounting research addresses questions related to 
the extent to which firm disclosures and other sources can be considered informative for valuation 
purposes and whether different stakeholders are using these sources while valuing their respective 
claim. 
 As financial statements issued by the firm are considered an important firm level disclosure I 
am interested in the effect of reporting regulation on these disclosures and firm decisions. In the 
second chapter of my dissertation, I study the effects of reporting regulation requiring firms to 
capitalize the expenditures of their development activities. Before the introduction of International 
Financial Reporting Standards, dependent on the local GAAP applicable, firms where either not 
allowed to capitalize development expenditures or it was left to their own discretion. When firms 
have discretion with respect to financial reporting, i centives start to play a role. The requirement to 
capitalize development expenditures under Internatio l Financial Reporting Standards diminishes 
the effect of reporting incentives. Because incentiv s no longer affect financial reporting, the 
capitalization of development activities becomes an informative signal. The results indicate that the 
characteristics of firms required to capitalize development expenditures are different from the firm 
characteristics identified by previous literature relating to voluntary capitalization. This result 
indicates that with the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards firm discretion is 
effectively removed. With respect to the informativeness of required capitalization the results 
indicate that the usefulness for valuation purposes i  related to the duration of the development 
cycle. This finding indicates that required capitaliz tion of development activities provides an 
informative signal. However, firms, especially those with a long development cycle, are likely to 
use other disclosures to inform their stakeholders about the successfulness of their development 
activities.  
Chapter 1  Introduction 11 
 In the third chapter I focus on a particular regulatory setting in the United States. More 
specifically I focus on transactions where a bank sells a portfolio of loans but guarantees the buyers 
a minimum cash flow, thereby retaining a part of the risks. These transactions, known as 
securitization with recourse, are shaped by the originating bank in such a way that the loans 
involved in the transaction are effectively removed from the balance sheet. In this study I argue and 
show that this particular transaction allows banks to effectively manage their liquidity needs. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the banks involved in these transactions are generally solvent; 
hence retaining the risks does not appear to be a problem for these banks. The loan portfolios 
transferred have generally low levels of payment delinquencies, indicating that the relatively good 
loans are being sold. The results also indicate that the banks securitizing with recourse are generally 
less involved in transactions where assets are sold temporarily and have more time deposits which 
will mature in less than one year. Overall these results indicate that securitization transactions with 
recourse can be considered an efficient instrument for liquidity management purposes. 
 In the fourth chapter of this dissertation I focus on differences in the valuation process by 
different stakeholders. I consider the market value of two different instruments as a summary 
statistic of the information used by the respective stakeholder. If changes in the prospects of a firm
are taken into account by both stakeholders simultaneously, a contemporaneous relation between 
the market values can be expected. However, if an intertemporal relation exists between market 
valuations, it indicates that one instrument can be considered informative for the valuation of the 
other instrument. In this study I focus on two instruments, namely equity shares and credit default 
swap (CDS) contracts. Dependent on observable firm characteristics I form trading strategies to 
exploit possible differences in the valuation process of the two instruments. The results indicate that 
dependent on the firm specific characteristics the valuation of both instruments can be considered 
informative for future changes in the value of the other instrument. In light of arbitrage 
opportunities this is not a straightforward result and it might be that the results are because my 
investment strategies select particular types of firms. Additional analysis indicates that the results 
cannot be considered a compensation for risk. Overall the results can be interpreted as an indication 
that both stock prices and CDS values, dependent on firm characteristics, contain information 
relevant for the valuation of the other instrument. 
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Chapter 2: Value relevance and determinants of development capitalization 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 With the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) the accounting 
treatment of development expenditures changed considerably. If a project meets the criteria the firm 
must capitalize the development expenditures related to that project. The criteria relate to the 
feasibility and the ability to deploy the developed asset; therefore capitalization of development 
activities contains information regarding the future prospects of these activities. The relevance of 
these disclosures for valuation purposes depends on the priors of the investors and hence on the 
extent to which this disclosure brings new information to the market.  
 In this study I will start by identifying firm char cteristics which affect the likelihood that the 
firm is required to capitalize the development expenditures related to a certain project. The second 
question I answer in this study relates to the information content of capitalized development 
expenditures in relation to firm characteristics.  
 The main assumption in this chapter is that managers have no discretion with respect to 
capitalization of development expenditures, as reporting regulation, IAS 38, requires capitalization 
and the external auditor will enforce this. 
 The findings indicate that larger firms with a relatively short development cycle and low levels 
of competition with respect to development activities are more likely to meet the criteria listed in 
IAS 38 and therefore are required to capitalize their d velopment expenditures. With respect to the 
information content the results indicate that the expected likelihood of required capitalization has a 
significant positive effect on the value relevance, while the relative duration of the development 
cycle is not significantly related to the valuation f the firm. 
 Previous literature has focused on incentives for capitalization. The introduction in the U.S. of 
SFAS 86 allowed for voluntary early adoption. Trombley (1989) focuses on these early adopters 
and identifies firm characteristics determining capitalization of development expenditures. Similarly 
the comment letters supporting the abolishment of SFAS 86 have been studied (Aboody and Lev 
(1998)). These studies indicate that the incentive to capitalize development expenditures depends on 
firm characteristics. While managers may have incentiv s to either capitalize or to avoid 
capitalization, the introduction of IFRS leaves them no discretion. With the introduction of IFRS, 
firms are required to capitalize development expenditures if for a project the requirements listed in 
paragraph 57 of IAS 38 are met. The external auditor puts limits on the inclination to capitalize at 
will, as it will verify whether the criteria are met and capitalization is required. 
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 The criteria listed in paragraph 57 of IAS38 relat to the likelihood of success and future 
usefulness of the development project. Capitalization of development expenditures therefore 
contains information relating to the prospect of the development activities, which without discretion 
is very informative. The value relevance of capitalization however need not be the same for all 
firms. In this study I identify the characteristics of firms which are more likely to capitalize 
development expenditures. Based on firm characteristics I will test the value relevance of 
development capitalization for different groups of firms.  
 I use a sample of firms from Germany and France for the period 1998-2011. In Germany the 
introduction of IFRS changed the accounting treatment of development expenditures. In France 
firms were able to capitalize development expenditures under French GAAP; this however was a 
voluntary choice. With the introduction of IFRS capit lization is no longer voluntary as 
capitalization is required if the project meets the following criteria: 1) Technical feasible to 
complete; 2) Intention to complete and use; 3) Ability to use or sell; 4) Existence of a market 
(external use) or usefulness (internal use) for the asset; 5) Adequate technical, financial and other 
resources to complete development and to use or sell the asset; 6) Reliable measurement of the 
development expenditure attributable to the asset. The criteria for capitalization are the same under 
IFRS as they were under French GAAP. 
 My findings indicate that larger firms with less competition with respect to development 
projects are more likely to be required to capitalize their development projects. The likelihood of 
capitalization in France is positively related to use of IFRS. This result can be interpreted as an 
indication that the value relevance of capitalization are limited as it is likely that French firms met 
the criteria for capitalization before IFRS was introduced but used their discretion before IFRS to 
avoid capitalization. Furthermore the results also indicate that firms with a shorter development 
cycle are more likely to be required capitalize; while firms with a long development cycle are 
significantly less likely to be required capitalize. This result is in line with the notion that the longer 
the lead time between the initial phase and completion of development activities the less reliable 
and credible the potential of the developed assets can be estimated.  
 The results for the value relevance analyses indicate that capitalization of development 
activities is relevant for valuation purposes. If Iseparate the firms on the basis of their development 
cycle the results indicate that capitalization is significantly more value relevant for firms with a 
relative short cycle and significantly less value relevant for firms with a relatively long development 
cycle. This result can be interpreted as an indication that if the length of the development cycle 
increases the likelihood increases other disclosures a  used to communicate information on the 
expected success of their development efforts. If I separate firms based on the expected likelihood 
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of required capitalization using the identified determinants the results are less straightforward. The 
expected likelihood of capitalization does not affect the value relevance of capitalized development 
expenditures. This finding indicates that while capitalization of development expenditures can be 
relevant for valuation purposes, it is likely not the only disclosure companies can make to 
communicate the potential of their development efforts and the value relevance of capitalized 
development expenditures is therefore likely to be related to the information incorporated in the 
valuation by investors. 
 This study extends our knowledge on the extent to which firms are required to capitalize their 
development expenditures. Determinants of required capitalization are identified and used to 
calculate the expected likelihood of required capitalization. My results indicate that in general 
capitalized development expenditures can be considered to be value relevant. However my results 
also indicate that the value relevance of capitalized development expenditures cannot be considered 
the same for all firms.  
 
2.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses Development 
 In this study I focus on the firm characteristics that relate to the requirement to capitalize 
development expenditures of firms using IFRS for their financial reporting. Previous literature has 
provided insights into the incentives associated with voluntary adoption of reporting regulation 
requiring capitalization of development activities. In the U.S. early adoption of SFAS 86, 
introduced in 1985, by software producers was allowed, and previous literature has studied the 
characteristics of the early adopters. Later software producers have lobbied for abolishment of 
SFAS 86; the characteristics of these petitioners have been studied as well. The combination of 
these two gives insights into the incentives of firms to capitalize their development activities. 
Trombley (1989) indicates that smaller, riskier and higher leveraged firms are more likely to choose 
for early adoption of SFAS 86. For these firms the capitalization has an income increasing effect 
which will benefit the firm in light of reported performance and the financial ratios. Aboody and 
Lev (1998) study the firm characteristics related to the petition for abolishment of SFAS 86. In the 
situation where investments in R&D activities are gowing, capitalizing instead of expensing the 
expenditures will positively affect reported performance (ROE and ROA). However, if the 
investments in R&D activities are constant or decreasing, the income increasing effect of 
capitalization will be offset by amortization and hence the reported performance (ROE and ROA) 
will be lower compared to the situation of expensing. The analysis presented by Aboody and Lev 
(1998) indicates that as of 1995 for the majority of firms the income increasing effect of 
capitalization is being offset by the amortization, which coincides with the petition to abolish SFAS 
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86. These results seem to indicate that firms which are no longer increasing their R&D activities 
have an incentive to expense instead of capitalize their R&D activities.  
 This literature relates firm characteristics to ince tives for capitalization of development 
expenditures. However under IFRS capitalization is required, the characteristics of firms required to 
capitalize need not be the same as those of firms capitalizing development expenditures voluntarily 
leading to a potential tension between reporting regulation and the incentives to use managerial 
discretion to avoid capitalization. Managerial discretion however is limited by the external auditor. 
The external auditor verifies whether the development project meets the six criteria for 
capitalization, listed in paragraph 57 of IAS 38: 1) Technical feasibility of completing; 2) Intention 
to complete and use; 3) Ability to use or sell; 4) Existence of a market (external use) or usefulness 
(internal use) for the asset; 5) Adequate technical, financial and other resources to complete 
development and to use or sell the asset; 6) Reliabl  measurement of the development expenditure 
attributable to the asset. If these requirements are met there is no managerial discretion, as 
capitalization of the development expenditures is required. 
 Based on the criteria for capitalization I use thefollowing proxies: firm size, leverage, 
solvency, competition with respect to development activities and the length of the development 
cycle. For these firm characteristics it is expected that they are associated with the likelihood that
the firm will be required to capitalize their development activities. 
 The first characteristic I consider is firm size. Previous literature has identified that bigger, 
more mature firms, have fewer benefits of capitalizing development activities with respect to 
reported performance, therefore it can be expected that managers of these firms have more 
incentives to use discretion in order to avoid capitalization. However larger firms are more likely to 
have a better developed accounting system, which makes it likely that they are better able to 
reliably measure the development expenditures attribu able to the assets (Doyle, Ge and McVay 
(2007)). Furthermore the size of the firm is likely to be positively associated with both the ability to 
use and the adequacy of resources available to complete and use the asset. In the setting where firm 
incentives are limited by the external auditor, I exp ct that firm size and required capitalization of 
development expenditures are positively associated. 
 To further capture the adequacy of resources available to complete and use the asset I also 
consider leverage and solvency ratios. In previous literature leverage has been used to proxy for the 
riskiness of the firm and a positive association betwe n the likelihood of capitalization is found. 
However the external auditor reduces the effect of managerial incentives. If a firm is higher 
leveraged it can be interpreted as an indication that t e firm is more risky and that the likelihood 
that the asset may be completed is limited. On the o r hand higher leverage may indicate that the 
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firm is successful at raising funds, which increases the likelihood that sufficient resources will be 
available to complete the development project. Because of these opposite effects I do not predict a 
direction of the association between leverage and the likelihood that the firm is required to 
capitalize. The solvency ratio of the firm however indicates that currently the firm has sufficient 
financial resources, which makes it more likely that the firm will meet the criteria requiring 
capitalization. Therefore I hypothesize that the lik lihood that the firm is required to capitalize is 
positively associated with the solvency ratio. 
 The Herfindahl Index with respect to research and development expenditures is used in order to 
measure the industry level development efforts. If the firm faces fierce competition with respect to 
development activities it likely signals that an external demand for the developed assets exists. It 
should be noted that it is unlikely that the firm will invest in development if the project is not 
expected to have any potential. On the other hand high research and development efforts on 
industry level might also indicate fierce competition with respect to the development of new but 
similar products. If competition with respect to the development of new products is high the 
likelihood that a particular firm will be successful in exploiting the market reduces. This influence 
reduces the likelihood that the firm is required to capitalize the development project is thereby 
reduced as well. Therefore I hypothesize that the lev l of competition is negatively associated with 
the likelihood that capitalization is required.  
 Using the report by the National Academy of Engineering (1992) I have identified the relative 
duration of the development cycle. If the time between the initial stage of development and the 
deployability of the asset increases arguably it becomes increasingly more difficult to reliably 
estimate the existence of a market and the availability of adequate resources to complete and deploy 
the developed asset. Therefore I expect that the relativ  duration of the development cycle is 
negatively related to the likelihood that the development project will meet the criteria requiring 
capitalization of the development expenditures. As capitalization is required, incentives are less 
likely to be the prime reason for capitalization. I propose that it is primarily firm and project 
characteristics that affect the capitalization requirement. In table 2.1 the characteristics and their 
hypothesized association with the likelihood of development capitalization are summarized. 
 




Table 2.1: Summary of expectations 
 
 The second question addressed in this study relates to the value relevance of required 
capitalization disclosures. As the required capitalization of development activities under IFRS is not
likely to be affected by firm incentives, and because of the criteria for required capitalization these 
disclosures are likely to provide an information signal about the future prospects of the development 
efforts. Capitalization of development expenditures under IFRS is therefore potentially relevant for 
firm valuation purposes. The relevance for valuation purposes of capitalization however need not be 
the same for all companies. If the development cycle is relatively short it can for instance be 
expected that the capitalization of development activities can be considered to be more value 
relevant as time for communication about the development activities has arguably been more 
limited and capitalization of these activities can therefore be considered to be an important part of 
the information set available to investors. If the development cycle is relatively long it is likely that 
more information relating to the development project has already been communicated to the 
investors and hence the capitalization of development activities does not provide new information 
to the investors. On the other hand even if the firm disclosed information about its development 
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efforts, the criteria for required capitalization may reduce uncertainty relating to the future prospects 
of the development activities. The effect of the duration of the development cycle on the value 
relevance of capitalized development activities is therefore not straightforward. Based on the 
characteristics associated with the requirement to capitalize development expenditures for each firm 
the likelihood of capitalized development can be prdicted. If a firm has a low expected likelihood 
of required capitalization, it is entirely possible that capitalization of development activities is 
relatively more relevant for valuation. On the other and if the expected likelihood of required 
capitalization is low, this may also indicate that development activities are relatively less relevant 
for valuation purposes. Therefore I hypothesize that t e capitalization of development activities will 
be relevant for valuation purposes. I hypothesize that with a relative long development cycle the 
firm will voluntarily disclose information relating to the expected prospects of the development 
activities. The information content of the capitaliz tion therefore is limited. If on the other hand the
development cycle is short, the capitalization is an important part of information, although it might 
also be that the capitalization coincides with other disclosures. 
 
2.3 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 In this study I focus on the effect of firm characteristics on the likelihood that required 
capitalization of development activities will actually occur. Therefore I focus on the European 
setting as mandatory adoption of IFRS was required in 2005. In particular I have selected two 
member states, Germany and France, because they hav reasonably sized equity markets. However 
there are some differences in the legal institutions between these two. In Germany, for instance, 
firms were allowed to voluntarily adopt IFRS before 2005, while in France firms were not allowed 
to do this. Another important difference between the German and French regulatory setting is that 
French companies were already allowed to capitalize development activities and IFRS criteria are 
similar compared to the criteria in French GAAP that applied to voluntary capitalization of 
development activities (Krens (1989)). The introduction of IFRS in France therefore changes the 
capitalization of development activities insofar that firms are required to capitalize if the criteria are 
met, while under French GAAP they were allowed to capitalize. 
 The reporting for intangible assets, among which R&D, is regulated by IAS 38. This standard 
has been effective since 1998. European firms were mandated to use IFRS for their financial 
reporting for any reporting period starting on or after 1 January 2004. In Germany however, firms 
were allowed to voluntarily adopt IFRS. Therefore I have selected the period 1998 to 2011 in order 
to study the determinants and value relevance of capitalization of development expenditures for 
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France, while German firms are only selected if they are using IFRS as a basis for their financial 
reporting.  
 I have used the Worldscope database in order to identify the companies domiciled in Germany 
and France. This led to a possible sample of 2,407 firms, hence 33,698 possible firm-year 
observations. Some firms are not covered by the Worldscope database, leaving me with a sample of 
26,124 firm-year observations representing 1,866 firms. From this sample only 748 firms have been 
identified as R&D active firms1. My sample therefore consists of 10,475 firm-year observations. 
Not for all of these firms financial data is available; my final sample therefore consists of 4,759 
firm-year observations representing 569 firms, of which 1,858 firm-year observations relate to 255 
German firms. The sample selection procedure is depicted in table 2.2. In order to reduce the effect 
of extreme observations the sample is winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of observations, the 
descriptive statistics are provided in table 2.3. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Description of the sample selection procedure. 
 
                                                          
1 A firm is considered to be an active firm with resp ct to R&D if the R&D expenditures for this firm are positive for at 
least one of the firm years in the sample. R&D expenditures are measured as the sum of expensed R&D and additions to 
capitalized development. 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics, variable descriptions  
are provided in section 2.7. 
 
 In this study I have used the Worldscope industry classification and the report by the committee 
on time horizons and technology investments (1992) in order to classify the research intensive 
industries according to their development and product cycles. In this report, industries which have 
relatively long or short development- and product cycles are identified; hence this creates four 
possible groups of R&D intensive industries: 1) both a long development and product cycle; 2) a 
long development cycle but a short product cycle; 3) a short development cycle, and a long product 
cycle and 4) both a short development and product cy le. Based on this classification I identify 
firms according to the relative duration of their development cycle and this classification will be 
used in the analysis of the determinants of required capitalization. This classification will be used in 
the value relevance analysis as well, where I will separate firms on the basis of the duration of the 
development cycle and study whether required capitaliza ion can be considered to have more 
information content with respect to future performance. The classification of the industries 
according to the relative duration of their development cycle is depicted in table 2.4. 




Table 2.4: Classification of industries according to  
the duration of their development cycle. 
 
2.4 Results 
 In this study I hypothesize that required capitalization of development expenditures are 
predictably related to firm characteristics. The firm characteristics I consider are the following: firm 
size, leverage, solvency, competition with respect to development activities and the length of the 
development cycle. These characteristics are selected as they are likely to be related to the criteria 
for required capitalization. I have specified the following probit model to simultaneously test the 
effect of firm characteristics on the likelihood of required capitalization. 
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The dependent variable in this model is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the gross amount of 
capitalized development reported by firm i increased during period t. LEVERAGEi,t is measured as 
the total liabilities divided by the total assets for irm i in period t. LNSIZEi,t denotes the natural 
logarithm of total assets for firm i in period t. SOLVENCYRATIOi,t is measured as earnings before 
interest and taxes divided by total liabilities forirm i in period t. The variable MTBi,t represents the 
market to book ratio of equity for firm i in period t. HERFRDi,t is the Herfindahl index calculated 
based on development expenditures for the industry of firm i calculated in period t. Finally I have 
included industry dummies. A similar specification has been used for Germany and France 
separately. In the analysis for France I have included a dummy variable capturing whether IFRS is 
being used for financial reporting2. Instead of industry dummies I have used the classification of 
development cycle3 in model 2 to test the effect of the development duration on the likelihood that 
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 The results of the models are presented in table 2.5. From this analysis it can be concluded that 
firm size is positively associated with the likelihood that firms are required to capitalize 
development expenditures. This is in line with my expectations that larger firms are more likely to 
be able to credibly measure the costs related to each development project and they are more likely 
to have sufficient resources to complete the project. Leverage is not associated with the likelihood 
of capitalization. The solvency ratio is negatively associated with the likelihood that the criteria for 
capitalization are met, which is not expected as it indicates that firms with fewer resources are more 
likely to capitalize. Furthermore as expected the lower the industry level of R&D efforts the more 
                                                            
2 Note that French companies were not allowed to voluntarily adopt IFRS, and mandatory adoption is applicab e as of 
2005. 
3 See table 4 for the classification of the industrie  according to the relative duration of their development cycle. 
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likely that the firm is required to capitalize development expenditures. This result is in line with the 
expectation that lower industry level R&D efforts make it more likely that a particular company 
will be successful in exploiting its development efforts and thus capitalization is required. The 
results for model 2 indicate that firms with a relatively short development cycle are significantly 
more likely to meet the criteria that require capitlization of their development expenditures. These 
results also indicate that firms with a relatively long development cycle are significantly less likely 
to be required to capitalize their development expenditures. These results are in line with the 
argument that as the duration of the development cycle increases it becomes more difficult to 
reliably estimate the existence of a market and the adequacy of recourses available to complete and 
deploy the asset developed. An interesting result in the separate analysis of France is the significant 
positive association between the use of IFRS and the required capitalization of development 
expenditures. This result indicates that firms in France are likely to meet the requirements that 
allows, or under IFRS requires, capitalization of development expenditures. This result can also be 
interpreted as an indication that the majority of firms do not view capitalization as beneficial; henc 
in the voluntary setting there are no incentives to capitalize development costs.  
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Table 2.5: Firm characteristics and the likelihood firms are required to  
capitalize development expenditures.  
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 The value relevance of capitalized development expenditures in France has been studied by 
Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2006). Their results indicate that the capitalization of development 
expenditures is relevant for valuation purposes for these companies. In this study I use the model of 
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The dependent variable is the stock price at the fiscal year-end t for firm i. BVEPSadji,t is the book 
value of equity per share measured at the end of year t for firm i, adjusted for the effect of 
capitalization on book value of equity. EPSadji,t represents the earnings before interest and taxes for 
firm i in year t per share, adjusted for the effects of capitalization and amortization of development 
expenditures. The amount of capitalized development expenditures, net of amortization, per share 
for firm i in period t is denoted by CAPDEVNETPSi,t. To test the value relevance of development 
capitalization for different groups of firms I define dummy variables for different groups of firms. 
Model 1 has been used to calculate the probability score that a specific firm is required to capitalize 
development expenditures. Based on this probability score three groups are created. The bottom 
33% of firms based are the least likely to meet the crit ria to capitalize development expenditures, 
LOWLi,t, the top 33% of firms are most likely to be required to capitalize, HIGHLi,t, and a middle 
group. The results are depicted in table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6: Value relevance, levels specification model 3, of  
R&D capitalization, firms are divided into groups based  
on the likelihood of required capitalization. 
 
 I have also divided the sample on the basis of the relative duration of the firms’ development 
cycle. For firms with a relatively short development cycle DEVSi is equal to 1, for firms with a 
relatively long development cycle DEVLi is equal to 1. The results for this analysis are presented in 
table 2.7.  




Table 2.7: Value relevance, levels specification model 3, of  
R&D capitalization, firms are divided into groups  
based on the duration of the development cycle. 
 
 The standard errors in these tables are corrected for firm level clustering (Petersen (2009)).The 
results indicate that on average the amount of capitalized development, net of an amortization, 
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cannot be considered to be value relevant. However for different groups of firms, differences in the 
value relevance of capitalized development, net of amortization, are observable. For firms with a 
high expected likelihood of meeting the criteria requiring capitalization, the capitalized 
development, net of amortization, is value relevant, while for the other firms no value relevance is 
observed. I also demonstrate that for firms with a low likelihood of capitalization the stock price is 
lower on average and the reported earnings are morevalu  relevant.  
 If the firms are separated on the basis of the duration of their development cycle I observe a 
different pattern. For all firms the book value of equity and the earnings per share, both adjusted for 
the effects of capitalization, are relevant for firm valuation. The results indicate that for firms in 
industries with a relatively long or short development cycle earnings are significantly less relevant 
for firm valuation. Furthermore the results indicate that in general the amount of capitalized 
development costs, net of amortization, can be considered to be value relevant, while for firms with 
a relatively long development capitalization is notvalue relevant. This finding is consistent with the
notion that the prospects of the development efforts a e likely to be known by the market due to 
disclosures during the relatively long development period, while with a relatively short 
development cycle the capitalization of development activities is likely to provide a timelier signal 
regarding the prospects of the development efforts. 
 In addition to a level specification for the value r levance of capitalized development 
expenditures I also use a return specification. This analysis will indicate whether capitalization of 
development expenditures, or changes in the capitalized amount, are reflective of changes in the 
economic value of the firm as reflected by the stock return during fiscal year t for firm i. In model 4 
the value relevance of capitalization is represented by the capitalized development expenditures and 
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 The dependent variable, RETURNi,t, in both these models is measured as the buy and hold 
return during the fiscal year: <=,>?<=,>?@
<=,>?@
, the independent EPSPadji,t is the earnings per share adjusted 
for capitalization and amortization of development projects scaled by beginning of period share 






. In model 4 the variable CAPPSPi,t captures the development expenditures per share, 




in model 5 the variable ∆CAPDEVNETPSPi,t denotes the change in capitalized development costs, 
net of amortization, per share divided by beginning of year share price: FCGHIJKI><B=,>?FCGHIJKI><B=,>?@
<=,>?@
. 
 The results of these analyses are presented in tables 2.8 and 2.9. The standard errors in these 
tables are corrected for firm level clustering (Petersen (2009)). The results indicate that the 
capitalization of development activities contain information which is relevant for the valuation of 
the company. If the firms are separated based on the likelihood of capitalization the results indicate 
that the value relevance of capitalization is driven by the groups for which it is most and least likely 
that they are required to capitalize. The value relvance of changes in the amount of development 
capitalized, net of amortization, is driven by the firms for which it is most likely that they will be 
required to capitalize. The separation on the basis of the duration of the development cycle yields 
different results. The value relevance of capitalization of development expenditures or changes in 
the net amount capitalized development does not differ dependent on the duration of the 
development cycle. 
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Table 2.8: Value relevance, return specification models 4 and 5, of  
R&D capitalization, firms are divided into groups based on the  
likelihood of required capitalization. 
 
 The results for the value relevance analysis indicate that investments in development activities 
are relevant for the valuation of firms. The relevance for valuation purposes of new investments or 
changes in the capitalized amount is driven by the likelihood that a company will be required to 
capitalize. As the likelihood of required capitaliztion depends on the ability of the firm to 
profitably deploy the newly development, this findig can be interpreted that the development 
efforts can only be interpreted as relevant for valuation purposes if the firm has sufficient resources 
and the incentive to complete the development and to eploy the asset. Furthermore the analyses 
indicate that the relevance of the amount capitalized, net of amortization, for valuation purposes 
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depends on the duration of the development cycle. This is in line with the expectation that during 
the development cycle firms will use different types of disclosures to provide a timely signal about 
the value of their development efforts, which is more likely to coincide with the capitalization of 
development expenditures if the duration of the development cycle is relatively short. 
 
 
Table 2.9: Value relevance, return specification models 4 and 5, of  
R&D capitalization, firms are divided into groups based on the  
duration of the development cycle. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
 In this study I examine the firm characteristics which can be considered to be indicators of the 
likelihood that firms are required to capitalize thir development expenditures. The value relevance 
of the capitalization of development expenditures are tested as well. 
 The results indicate that larger firms, with a shorter development cycle and operating in an 
industry facing relative low levels of competition with respect to development efforts are more 
likely to meet the criteria requiring capitalization f their development expenditures. This finding is 
in line with my expectations that these firms are lik ly more capable to credibly measure the costs 
and prospects of their development efforts.  
 With respect to the value relevance analyses the results indicate that capitalization of 
development expenditures can be relevant for valuation purposes, however it is not straightforward 
that this will be similar for all firms. I find that the value relevance of the book value of capitalized 
development activities is negatively related to the duration of the development cycle. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that firms are able to use different disclosures to communicate the 
prospects of their development efforts and that the firms with a relatively long development cycle 
are less likely to be dependent on the capitalization of development expenditures in order to provide 
a signal about the prospects of their development efforts. Furthermore, the changes specification 
indicates that investments in development activities are relevant for valuation purposes but that this 
is likely dependent on the ability of the firm to complete the development of the asset and 
successfully deploy it. This conclusion is based on the results indicating that changes in capitalized 
development are value relevant for firms which are most likely to be required to capitalize, where 
the likelihood for required capitalization depends on the completion and deployment of the 
developed asset. 
 These findings contribute to the literature on IFRS and financial reporting quality. Using a 
setting with relatively powerful political institutions the determinants of required capitalization are 
studied. Furthermore my results contribute to the value relevance literature on capitalization of 
development expenditures, as they indicate that, given the setting with relative strong enforcement 
of financial reporting regulation, capitalization of development expenditures cannot be considered 
to be relevant for valuation purposes for all firms, but predictably differs based on the 
characteristics of firms. This study also contributes o the literature on financial reporting incentives 
as the analysis of the determinants of capitalization indicates that the introduction of IFRS has 
changed the accounting treatment in France. The results indicate that in the voluntary setting, with 
similar criteria, development expenditures are less likely to be capitalized, in line with lower 
perceived benefits of capitalization. 
Chapter 2  Value relevance and determinants of development capitalization 33 
 
 
 An important assumption, and possible short coming in this chapter, is the reliance on the 
external auditor. I assume that the external auditor is aware of managerial incentives to capitalize 
development expenditures or to avoid capitalization. Furthermore I assume that the external auditor 
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2.7 Appendix A: Variable Description 
BVEPS  Book Value of Equity divided by the number of c mmon shares outstanding. 
BVEPSadj  Book Value Of Equity, adjusted for the capit lized amount of development 
    expenditures net of amortizations, divided by the number of common shares 
    outstanding. 
EPS   Earnings Before Interest and Taxes divided by the number of common shares 
    outstanding. 
EPSadj  Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, adjuste for the changes in the  
    capitalized amount of development expenditures net of amortizations, divided 
    by the number of common shares outstanding. 
EPSP   EPS divided by lagged Price. 
EPSadjP  EPSadj divided by lagged Price. 
CapPS   Increase in gross capitalized development expenditures divided by the  
    number of common shares outstanding. 
CapPSP  CapPS divided by lagged Price. 
dCapDevNetPS Change in capitalized development expenditures net of amortization divided 
    by common shares outstanding. 
dCapDevNetPSP dCapDevNetPSP divided by lagged price. 
DumRDCap  Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i in year t capitalizes development  
    expenditures, the change in CapPS is positive. 
IFRS   Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm uses IFRS as financial reporting  
    standard. 
LEVERAGE  Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
LnSIZE  Natural logarithm of total assets. 
MTB   Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
Price   Price per share. 
Return   Stock return during the financial reporting period. 
SolvencyRatio Earnings Before Interest and Taxes divided by total liabilities. 
HerfRD  Sum of squared research and development shares c lculated per year per  
    industry. 
DevS   Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to an industry with a relatively 
    short development cycle. 
DevL   Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to an industry with a relatively 
    long development cycle. 
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LowL   Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the bottom 33% of  
    observations based on the propensity score calculated using model 1. This 
    indicates that the firm is less likely to be required to capitalize. 
HighL   Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the top 33% of observations 
    based on the propensity score calculated using model 1. This indicates that 
    the firm is more likely to be required to capitlize. 
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Chapter 3: Securitizations with recourse and the liquidity needs of banks 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I study the securitization of loans where the issuing banks provide a guarantee 
regarding the principal amount. Previous literature has indicated that securitization transactions in 
general are used by issuing banks to manage their equ ty capital or to diversify the risk of their 
portfolio of assets. However, little is known about the determinants of securitization transactions 
where a guarantee is provided. In this chapter I argue and show that these specific securitization 
transactions are used for liquidity management purposes. 
 A securitization transaction facilitates banks to sell portfolios of loans. The buying party will 
receive future cash flows paid by the borrowers in return for a cash payment at the time of the 
securitization transaction. Previous literature hasindicated that securitization transactions can be 
used by banks to deploy regulatory equity capital mnagement efficiently and rebalance their 
portfolio of risky assets. These prior studies focus on securitization transactions where a portfolio f 
loans including payment delinquency risks is sold (Pavel and Philis (1987), Gorton and Pennacchi 
(1995), Calomiris and Mason (2004), Gorton and Souleles (2005), Landsman, Peasnell and 
Shakespeare (2008), Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2010)).  
 However, not all securitization transactions include the sale of payment delinquency risks. In 
this study, I focus on securitization transactions where the future cash flows of the loan portfolio are
sold, but payment delinquency risks are partly retain d. Because risks are partly retained, the 
regulatory capital ratios are not affected and hence this particular type of securitization transaction 
does not benefit originating banks with respect to regulatory capital management or risk 
management of their asset portfolio. As prior litera u e has not focused on this type of 
securitization, little is known about the determinants of this particular type of transaction. In this 
chapter I argue that these securitization transactions are used for managing liquidity needs. By 
providing recourse, a guarantee relating to the principal loan amount, the originating bank ensures a 
minimum cash flow to the buying party. The buyers face less risk and hence will not price protect 
themselves against the risk of payment delinquencies, which benefits the bank in the form of a 
higher selling price. Besides the higher selling price, recourse arguably provides a signal about the 
quality of the portfolio of loans being sold, more specifically about the payment delinquency risks, 
positively affecting the likelihood that the loan portfolio can be securitized. In light of liquidity 
management, recourse can therefore be desirable. 
 The results indicate that originating banks which provide recourse on the principal amount of 
their securitized loans are solvent banks, but generally have more short term liabilities. This 
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indicates that these banks use the securitization transaction with recourse as a temporal solution to 
liquidity needs. The equity capital buffer held by the originating banks plays an important role, 
indicating that generally the originating banks involved in these transactions are able to fulfill their 
long term obligations. The sample period covers the financial crisis, a period where the money 
market dried up; during these years banks are still able to securitize portfolios of loans with 
recourse. This is in line with my expectation that the provision of recourse provides a signal 
regarding the possible payment delinquency risks of the loan portfolio being securitized. 
 These findings contribute to the literature relating to securitization transactions as I study a 
different type of securitization transaction than prior literature has focused on, namely 
securitizations with recourse. The determinants for this particular type of securitization differ from 
the determinants indicated by previous literature. More importantly the findings indicate that 
securitization transactions with recourse are a mechanism which can be used by banks to manage 
their temporal liquidity needs. 
 
3.2 Theory and hypotheses 
 Liquidity is crucial for the continuity of banks. In this chapter I argue that securitization 
transactions with recourse allow banks to cope with a temporal upswing in liquidity needs. As a 
source of liquidity a bank as any other firm can try to sell some of its assets. In order to sell a 
portfolio of loans a bank can either try to find a p rty willing to buy the entire portfolio or they can 
setup a securitization transaction. The benefit of the securitization transaction is that the loan 
portfolio can be bought by multiple parties which increases the likelihood that the portfolio will be 
sold. A securitization transaction entails that theoriginating bank establishes a Special Purpose 
Entity (SPE). A group of investors invests in the SPE, either as debtholders or as equity investors4. 
This investment provides the SPE with the necessary c pital to buy the selected portfolio of bank 
loans from the originating bank. Then the portfolio of loans is transferred to the SPE and the 
originating bank will receive cash in return. The borrowers continue to make their payments and 
these form the return for the investors of the SPE (Hartgraves and Benston (2002), Dharan (2002)). 
 In a securitization transaction payment delinquency risks can either be transferred to the 
investors of the SPE5 or be retained by the originating bank. If payment delinquencies risks are 
partly retained by an originating bank they simply guarantee a minimum cash flow of the 
                                                            
4 In this chapter I do not focus on the financing of the SPE, however regulations stipulate that the SPE should in part be 
financed with equity capital in order to guarantee that a party other than the originating bank bears the payment 
delinquency risks. 
5 The supervisory bodies of the banking industry recognize the transfer of the risks and the originating bank is no longer 
required to hold regulatory capital for the assets which have been transferred to the SPE. 
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transferred loan portfolio6 , which is henceforth referred to as providing recourse with the 
transaction. It is important to note that the recourse provided relates to the principal amount of the 
loans transferred. The recourse agreement basically ensures a minimum cash flow to the SPE. The 
originating bank is only required to pay recourse, if the total cash flow to the SPE, which is defined 
as interest payments plus repayment of the loan, is les  than the principal amount of the loan 
portfolio. Payment delinquency risks are therefore only partly retained by the originating bank7.  
 The main benefit to originating banks from securitization transactions without recourse is with 
respect to regulatory capital levels to be held. If the originating bank is close to violating the 
minimum levels set by the supervisory bodies they can benefit from a securitization transaction 
(Pavel and Phillis (1987), Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Calomiris and Mason (2004)). By selling a 
loan portfolio and the risks related to this portfolio they will be able to lower their Risk Weighted 
Assets (RWA)8 which in turn will lower the capital levels the bank is required to hold, ceteris 
paribus. Securitization transactions can also benefit banks with respect to risk exposure 
management, either by selling the risks or by creating means to diversify their loan portfolio (Pavel 
and Phillis (1987), Dharan (2002)). 
 However this does not apply to securitized loans where recourse is provided. In this study a 
time period with specific regulation is exploited. The reporting regulation allows these 
securitization transactions to be treated as a sale and hence the loan portfolio will no longer be 
reflected on the balance sheet. However the RWA used to determine the required regulatory capital 
levels will not reduce as a result of a securitization ransaction with recourse as the originating bank 
remains partly liable for the risks9. The benefits from a securitization transaction with recourse are 
therefore arguably solely related to liquidity needs. In this study I focus on the securitization 
transactions where the originating bank provides recourse. I expect that banks can use securitization 
transactions with recourse as a means to gain access to liquidity in order to meet the temporary 
                                                            
6 The supervisory bodies of the banking industry recognize that the risks of the loan portfolio have not been transferred 
to the SPE. Therefore the originating bank is required to hold regulatory capital, as if the assets have not been 
transferred to the SPE. 
7 If a bank securitizes a portfolio of loans with a principal amount of $100,000 and an interest rate of 10%, with a 
maturity of 1 year, the SPE can receive as maximum a cash flow of $100,000 * 1.10 = $110,000. If 5% of the borrowers 
defaults the SPE receives a cash flow of ($100,000 * (1-0.05)) * 1.10 = $104,500, which is more than the principal 
amount and hence no recourse has to be provided. However, if 10% of the borrowers defaults then the SPE can expect 
to receive ($100,000 * (1-0.10)) * 1.10 = $99,000, which is less than the principal amount of the loan portfolio 
securitized and hence recourse has to be provided ($100,000 - $99,000 = $1,000).  
8 The supervisory bodies require banks to make an assessment of the risks of all their assets and classify them 
accordingly. Cash and certain state obligations are for instance considered to be riskless and therefore get a risk 
weighting of 0%. Credit card loans on the other hand re considered to be risky and therefore get a weighting of 100%. 
The total Risk Weighted Assets are calculated by multiplying the assets with the appropriate risk weighting factor and 
then adding them. The bank is required to finance part of these RWA with equity capital, which is known as the 
regulatory capital requirements. 
9 The banking supervisory body requires banks to recgnize all assets for which they are liable when determining the 
regulatory capital level even if these assets are not reflected on the balance sheet. 
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liquidity needs of their organization. With respect to providing liquidity to guarantee the continuity 
of the bank it is important to note that I do not argue that these banks are distressed. Therefore I do 
not expect that there is a need for these banks to get rid of the risks related to the loan portfolio. In 
light of liquidity, retaining the risks actually ben fits the originating banks as the price paid willnot 
be discounted for the risk. Hence more cash will be received compared to a securitization without 
recourse. Securitization transactions with recourse can therefore be seen as part of the strategy 
banks use to fund their organization. 
 
H 1: Securitization transactions with recourse are positively associated with higher   
  liquidity needs. 
 
 Providing recourse likely benefits the originating bank in the price investors of the SPE are 
willing to pay for the securitized loan portfolio, as investors in the SPE do not have default risks 
other than the interest payments. In light of the recourse it is important that the originating bank will 
be able to provide recourse, or at least that the inv stors of the SPE perceive the originating bank as 
being able to provide recourse. Arguably solvency is an important indicator of the ability to provide 
recourse. Banks with low levels of solvency reveal to the market that they may not be able to meet 
their obligations. Therefore I expect that banks with low levels of solvency will not be able to 
securitize a portfolio with recourse as the recourse guarantee will not be deemed credible, hence the 
bank derives no value from providing it. Conversely I expect that originating banks will be 
perceived as solvent, and hence the provided recourse will be interpreted as a credible commitment. 
The likelihood that a securitization with recourse will occur is higher when the originating bank is 
more solvent. The equity capital buffer held by theoriginating bank can be interpreted as an 
indicator of the general solvency of the bank. The credibility of the recourse provided is likely to be
positively related to the size of the equity capital buffer. If a bank has a low equity capital buffer, 
the recourse is not likely to be perceived credible and therefore I do not expect that the bank will 
provide recourse in these situations. With respect to he solvency of the originating bank I 
hypothesize the following: 
 
H 2: Securitization transactions with recourse are positively associated with the solvency of  
  the originating bank.  
 
 While securitization transactions with recourse meet the criteria for off-balance sheet treatment, 
this not necessarily holds for the recourse obligation. The originating bank is required to recognize a 
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provision for any material obligation relating to recourse. If the expected payment delinquencies are 
considerably low, the originating bank will not be required to recognize a provision for the expected 
recourse obligation. As the off-balance sheet nature of these transactions is beneficial to the 
originating bank, I expect that banks are likely to securitize loans which are relatively safe, thereby 
reducing the expected payment delinquencies.  
 
H 3: The loan portfolio securitized with recourse has significantly lower payment   
  delinquency risks. 
 
3.3 Data Description 
 I use the Bank Regulatory database from the Chicago Federal Reserve. This database contains 
information from the Y-9C forms, which all US banks file quarterly with the Federal Reserve. 
Besides balance sheet and income statement data, schedule HC-S of the Y-9C form contains 
information related to securitization transactions in which the originating bank is involved. The data 
collection process is described in Table 1. In thisstudy I focus on securitization transactions with 
recourse. Data on these transactions is only available as of the second quarter of 2001 and for most 
of the sample as of the fourth quarter of 2001. In my analysis I therefore cover the time period from 
the first quarter of 2002 until the fourth quarter of 201010. In this time period the specific accounting 
rules treated the securitization transaction with recourse as a sale, hence the loan portfolio is no 
longer reflected on the balance sheet11. The banking supervision bodies do not allow a similar 
treatment with respect to the regulatory capital requirements. From the Bank Regulatory database I 
am able to obtain 134,123 quarterly observations. These observations contain all bank offices, 
which implies that a bank conglomerate will have multiple observations as both the parent bank as 
well as all subsidiary banks will be in the Bank Regulatory sample. I limit my sample to parent 
companies only, which I have identified as the Bank Regulatory observations which can be matched 
to stock market data. The identifier file provided by the Chicago Federal Reserve, which allows a 
match with the CRSP database, has been used. After matching my bank sample with the CRSP 
database I have 14,256 quarterly observations, relating to 523 unique banks. After removing 
observations with missing data the sample consists of 13,334 quarterly observations relating to 508 
unique banks, see table 3.1.  
 
                                                            
10 The beginning of our sampling period coincides with changes in the regulatory environment in the U.S. The financial 
reporting standards changed considerably with respect to the accounting and required disclosures relating to 
securitization activities. 
11 Note that the off-balance sheet treatment does not relate to the recourse obligation, as the originating bank is required 
to recognize a provision for all material recourse obligations on their balance sheet. 
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Table 3.1: Description of sample the 
selection procedure. 
 
 All observations are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. Previous literature (Pavel and 
Phillis (1987)) has indicated not all banks are able to securitize a portfolio of loans due to scale 
therefore I have created two samples. The first is a matched sample, using propensity score 
matching12. The quarterly observations of the securitizing banks are matched to the quarterly 
observations of a bank not involved in securitizations with recourse during the sample period. 
Furthermore I force that the matched bank is the same for each observed period. In the set of 508 
banks there are 98 unique banks that securitize a portfolio of loans in 671 quarters. The matched 
sample therefore consists out of 1,342 quarterly observations. The second sample contains all 
quarterly observations of the banks involved in securitization transactions where recourse is 
provided during the sample period. This sample consists out of 2,834 quarterly observations relating 
to 98 unique banks. 
 
3.3.1 Measurement issues 
 For the banks in our sample I am able to observe the principal amount of loans that are 
securitized with recourse. Unfortunately, I am not able to directly observe when a securitization 
with recourse has occurred or what the direct cash flows of these transactions are. Therefore I use 
the change in the principal amount of securitized loan portfolios as a proxy. Based on this 
information the securitizing banks are identified for the samples used in my analysis. First I identify 
banks that are never involved in securitization trasactions with recourse during my sample period. 
For these observations a dummy variable, DUMSECURIZITERi, will equal zero, otherwise it 
equals one. This distinction is used for the creation of my matched sample. Secondly I identify the 
                                                          
12 In the matching procedure the size of the bank, LN(RWA), the Tier1Ratio, deposits, short term liabilities, net federal 
funds purchased and the net repo assets are taken into account. 
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banks that increase their securitization activities in the observed period. The dummy variable 




YXRX=,>?@, is positive.  
 In this study I argue that securitization transactions with recourse are likely to occur for 
liquidity reasons. The short term liabilities are like y to give an indication of the need to use 
securitization transactions with recourse for liquidity management purposes. The observations are 
ranked based on the ratio 
B\]^>_I^`a=Cb=c=>=Id=,>
efg=,>
 or on 
B\]^>_I^`_=`IHIG]d=>d=,>
efg=,>
. For each of the rankings a 
dummy variable DumLIQinci,t is created, equal to one if the observation belongs to the top quartile 
of the distribution, to identify the observations that have a liquidity incentive. The initial sample 
consisting of 13,334 quarterly observations relating o 508 unique banks is used for the ranking. In 
the matched sample 226 of the 1,342 quarterly observations have been identified as banks with high 
short term liabilities and 264 as banks with high time deposits with a maturity of less than 1 year, 
85 and 139 of these observations relate to securitizing banks. In the sample of securitizing banks 
574 of the 2,834 quarterly observations have been classified as banks with high short term liabilities 
and 655 as banks with a high amount of time deposits with a maturity of less than 1 year, 85 and 
139 of these relate to quarterly observations where a portfolio of loans is being securitized. 
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These models test the association between bank characteristics and the likelihood that the bank 
securitizes a portfolio of loans with recourse in the current period. In model 1 the variables of 
interest are the SHORTTERMLIABILITIESi,t, denoting the short term liabilities divided by the 
total risk weighted assets and PERCSTTIMEi,t, which denotes the short term time deposits divided 
by the total time deposits. In model 2 I use the dummy variable DumLIQinc, to capture the liquidity 
incentives. 
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 Besides our variables of interest I control for the equity capital held by the bank by including 






the size of the bank, LN(RWAi,t) and DEPOSITSTOTALi,t, which are the total deposits held by the 
bank divided by the total RWA. I control for the deposits a bank holds as they can be considered a 
source of liquidity. Deposits can be expected to dampen the need for securitization transactions. 
 Hypothesis 1 states that securitization transactions are positively associated with liquidity 
requirements, which is tested by the parameters β3 and β4 in model 1 and in model 2 by β3, β4 and 
β5. Hypothesis 2 states that only if the S/O bank is sufficiently solvent I will be able to observe a 
securitization transaction with recourse. This is hypothesis can be tested using parameters β1 and β2 
in both models, relating the equity capital buffer to the likelihood that a securitization transaction 
with recourse will occur. 
 
3.4 Results 
 The descriptive statistics for the samples are provided in tables 3.2 and 3.3. Table 3.2 provides 
the descriptive statistics for the matched sample. The banks securitizing with recourse have on 
average significantly more time deposits with a maturity of less than 1 year, however they have 
significantly less short term liabilities and also ignificantly lower levels of deposits. Furthermore 
the banks securitizing with recourse tend to be a bit bigger on average. These univariate results give
a first indication that securitization transactions with recourse can be used for liquidity management 
purposes, as the short term time deposits are repres ntative of the short term liquidity needs which 
are predictable by the bank and other sources of finance, namely deposits, federal funds or repo 
transactions, are not, or to a lesser extent, being used by the securitizing banks.  
                                                            
13 A dummy variable equal to one if the Tier 1 Capital ratio is lower than 6.5%, which has been indicated to be the 
benchmark level for this ratio. 




Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics, variable descriptions are provided in section 3.7. The  
*,** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance of difference in means. 
 
 In table 3.3 the descriptive statistics for the securitizers sample are presented. These descriptive 
statistics indicate that in the periods a securitization transaction occurs the bank has more time 
deposits with a maturity of less than 1 year. Furthermore the short term liabilities as well as the 
deposits appear to be lower during the securitization periods. The descriptive statistics for this 
sample provide support for hypothesis 2 as well, as in the periods that the bank securitizes with 
recourse they are significantly less likely to have  low tier 1 capital ratio. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics, variable descriptions are provided in section 3.7. The  
*,** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance of difference in means. 
 
 The securitization transaction with recourse can be used to manage liquidity needs. The banks 
securitizing with recourse have higher cash levels, furthermore they appear to have increased their 
cash holdings significantly more, as can be seen in table 3.4. Their leverage has been increasing and 
their time deposits have not changed significantly. Furthermore the payment delinquencies of the 
portfolio of loans held by the banks in securitization transactions with recourse have slightly higher 
payment delinquency risks. However if the payment delinquency risks of the securitized portfolios 
are compared to the loan portfolios retained by the banks the securitized portfolios appear to be 
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significantly less risky. This result is in line with the notion that securitization transactions with 
recourse are done for liquidity reasons and not getting rid of risky assets. The comparison of the 
payment delinquency rates of the securitized portfolio and total loan portfolio with the risk free 
interest rate indicates that the payment delinquency rates of the securitized portfolio are only 0.5% 
higher, while the payment delinquency risks of the total loan portfolio tend to be 6% to 8% higher 
than the risk free rate.  
 
 
Table 3.4: Test of differences in means between securitizers and non-securitizers for the  
matched sample. And test of differences in means between securitizing and  
non-securitizing periods for the sample of securitizing banks.  
 
 As long as the interest rate on the securitized loan portfolio is higher than the rate of payment 
delinquencies the originating bank will not have to pay recourse. While the difference of 0.5% is 
significantly different, it can be expected that the difference between the average interest rate on 
loans and the risk free rate will be bigger. Therefor  hypothesis 3 can be accepted as the securitized 
loans can be interpreted as loan portfolios with a rel tively good performance and the originating 
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bank is not likely to be required to pay recourse. B cause the expected real cost of providing 
recourse are so limited, the originating bank does not have to recognize a provision for the 
immaterial amount of expected recourse. Overall these findings can be interpreted as an indication 
that by providing recourse originating banks are abl  to provide a credible signal about the payment 
delinquency risks, making securitization transactions with recourse a tool to manage their liquidity 
needs. 
 Besides these univariate results I have used model 1 to test the determinants of securitization 
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 The results of this model, for both the matched an the securitizers sample are depicted in table 
3.5. These results indicate that the likelihood of a securitization transaction with recourse is 
positively associated with percentage of time deposits with a maturity of less than 1 year, and there 
is a positive association with the tier 1 Ratio. Consistent with the univariate results the likelihood of 
a securitization with recourse is negatively associated with the amount of total deposits held by the 
bank, although in the multivariate analysis this asociation is not significantly different from zero. 
These findings are in line with the first and second hypotheses. As I argue that the banks involved 
in these securitization transactions are likely to do so because in light of liquidity management. 
These banks are apparently not attracting other sources of liquidity and the short term liabilities 
positively associated with the likelihood of the securitization transaction are actually those that are 
manageable by the bank.  
 




Table 3.5: Determinants of securitization transactions  
where recourse is provided, model 1. 
 
 Furthermore, I argue that providing recourse has no merit if the originating bank cannot be 
considered solvent, in line with this argument I find that the equity capital buffer as well as the siz  
of the bank are positively associated with the likelihood that a portfolio will be securitized with 
recourse. The analysis for the securitizers sample indicates that bank solvency is important, as 
banks with a low equity capital buffer are significantly less likely to securitize with recourse, and 
the banks securitizing are significantly less likely to use deposits as a source of liquidity. The 
likelihood of a securitization transaction is positively associated with the amount of time deposits 
with a maturity of less than 1 year. Overall these findings support my hypotheses as solvency is 
important in light of providing recourse and securitization transactions with recourse can be 
interpreted as a means to manage liquidity needs. 
 In model 2 I replace the continuous variables to capture securitization incentives by dummy 
variables capturing high levels of either total short term liabilities or time deposits with a maturity 
of less than 1 year.  
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The results of this model are depicted in table 3.6. From these results in the matched sample it can 
be concluded that the likelihood of a securitization with recourse is significantly negatively 
associated with high levels of total short term liabi ties, however there is a significant positive 
association with the amount of time deposits with a m turity of less than one year. In both 
regressions the likelihood of a securitization transaction with recourse is positively associated with 
bank size and the equity capital buffer and negatively associated with the use of other sources of 
liquidity. These findings are again supportive of bth hypotheses. And the different association for 
the two dummy variables can be expected in light of liquidity management as the amount of time 
deposits which will mature in less than 1 year is the amount of short term liabilities which is easily 
predictable, and therefore manageable, by the bank.  
 
 
Table 3.6: Determinants of securitization transactions where recourse is provided, model 2. 
 
 The results for the securitizers sample only provide partial evidence for the hypothesis. Banks 
with a low equity capital buffer are significantly less likely to securitize with recourse, which is in 
line with the second hypothesis. Furthermore banks which are securitizing with recourse have fewer 
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deposits, which is supportive of hypothesis one where I argue that securitization transactions with 
recourse can be used for liquidity management purposes. The results from model 2 however do not 
indicate a significant association with either indicator variable. 
 Overall the results from the multivariate analysis indicates that securitizations with recourse 
can be interpreted as a substitute for other liquidty sources, more specifically other deposits, that
these transactions appear to be used to manage predictable short term liabilities, more specifically 
they are positively associated with the amount of time deposits maturing within 1 year. As solvency 
is positively associated with the likelihood of a securitization transaction with recourse, originating 
banks are therefore required to maintain sufficiently high levels of equity capital, which can be 
considered costly, in order to signal their ability to honor the recourse commitment. Providing 
recourse can therefore be interpreted as providing a credible signal regarding the payment 
delinquency risks of the securitized loan portfolio. 
 
3.5 Conclusions: 
 In this study I argue and find that securitization transactions with recourse can be used by 
originating banks to manage their liquidity needs. The analysis indicates that the loan portfolios 
securitized with recourse are generally portfolios with considerably low payment delinquency risks. 
These risks are reasonably low that the originating bank can expect not to have to provide recourse 
and hence no provision for this recourse commitment has to be recognized on balance. Furthermore 
this indicates that the provision of recourse can be interpreted by the buying party as a credible 
signal relating to the payment delinquency risks of the loan portfolio offered. This makes it possible 
that during the financial crisis, a period where thmoney markets dried up, banks where still able to 
manage their liquidity needs using this particular tr nsaction. Furthermore the results indicate that 
the use of securitization transactions with recourse is significantly positively associated with short 
term liabilities, which appear to be easily predictable by the originating bank, making it more likely 
that it is indeed a liquidity management tool instead of a quick liquidity source. The securitization 
transactions with recourse can also be interpreted as a substitute source of liquidity as securitizing 
banks have fewer deposits and make less use of federal funds or repo transactions. 
 This study has two contributions. First the findings presented in this study contribute to the 
literature regarding the determinants of securitizat on transactions. Previous literature has primarily 
focused on the effects securitizations can have on the management of regulatory capital or risk 
exposure. The findings in this study indicate that t e need to manage liquidity is a very important 
incentive for securitization transactions as well. The second contribution this study makes is that 
originating banks are able to provide a credible signal regarding the quality of the loan portfolio 
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being securitized. More specifically the loan portflios securitized with recourse have reasonably 
low payment delinquency risks, which indicate that this specific type of securitization is not being 
used to transfer risks to the buying party. Because of the credibility of the signal from providing 
recourse these transactions have facilitated banks during a difficult time, the financial crisis, to deal 
with their liquidity needs and provide a signal regarding their solvency.  
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3.7 Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Cashi,t     Cash and cash equivalents held by the bank i in period  
      t, scaled by RWA. 
Deposits Timei,t   All the deposits serviced by bank i in period t, with a  
      maturity of more than 1 year, scaled by RWAi,t. 
Deposits Totali,t   All the deposits serviced by bank i in period t, scaled  
      by RWAi,t. 
DumLIQinc – ST Liabilitiesi,t Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the observation of bank i  
      in period t  belongs to the top quartile of Short Term  
      Liabilitiesi,t. 
DumLIQinc – ST TimeDepositsi,t Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the observation of bank i  
      in period t  belongs to the top quartile of Short Term  
      Time Depositsi,t. 
IncrSeci,t    Dummy variable equal to 1 if bank i in period t   
      increases its securitization activities. 
Leveragei,t    Total liabilities divided by total risk weighted assets for  
      bank i in period t (the risk weighted assets are used as  
      scalar as they are not affected by the securitization   
      transaction). 
LnRWAi,t    Natural logarithm of the Risk Weighted Assets of bank  
      i in period t. 
LowTier1Ratioi,t   Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the Tier 1 Ratio of bank  
      i in period t lower is than 6,5%, which has been   
      indicated to be the benchmark level for this ratio. 
Net Federal Fundsi,t   All Federal Funds bought minus Federal Funds sold for  
      bank i in period t. Federal Funds are used by banks to  
      borrow (bought) or lend (sell) from each other. 
Net REPOi,t    All assets sold with a buy back guarantee minus all  
      assets bought with a buy back guarantee for bank i in  
      period t. 
PercSTTimei,t    All time deposits with a remaining maturity of less  
      than 1 year divided by the total amount of time deposits,  
      for bank i in period t. 
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PercPDNeti,t    Total amount of payment delinquencies, excluding the  
      amounts guaranteed by the government, divided by the  
      total loan portfolio held by bank i in period t. 
PercPDSeci,t    Total amount of payment delinquencies, excluding the  
      amounts guaranteed by the government, divided by the  
      total amount of securitized loans for bank I in period t. 
Risk Free Ratet   The three month treasury rate for period t. 
Risk Weighted Assetsi,t  The sum of the different assets, multiplied by their risk  
      weights for bank i in period t (the risk baskets are   
      defined in the Basel II accords). 
Securitizeri    Dummy variable, equal to 1 if bank i has securitized a  
      portfolio of loans in any of the observed periods. 
Short Term Liabilitiesi,t  Total of the short term liabilities for bank i in period t. 
Tier 1 Ratioi,t    Tier 1 capital divided by the RWA for bank i in period  
      t (the Tier 1 capital is defined in the Basel II accords). 
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Chapter 4: Credit Default Swaps and Stock Prices as Leading Indicators 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 A widely accepted notion in the valuation literature is that relevant information will be taken 
into account by different stakeholders when valuing their respective stakes in a firm. In this study I 
focus on two specific financial commodities, namely Credit Default Swap contracts (CDS 
contracts) and equity shares. The value of these commodities can be interpreted as a summary 
statistic of information used for valuation. Different stakeholders might focus on different parts of 
the information set for the valuation of their respctive stakes. In this study I focus on the question 
whether changes in the value of either instrument are indicative of future changes in the value of the 
other instrument.  
 For both the shareholders and the CDS contract holders a market value of their respective stake 
in the firm is observable. For stockholders stock prices are observable and for CDS contract holders 
the Credit Default Swap spreads (CDS spreads). Bothstakeholders take into account the prospect of 
the firm and changes in the market values can therefore be interpreted as an indication of changes in 
the expectations of the respective stakeholders. The shareholder’s focus is on the maximization of 
the residual claim to which they are entitled. In general the share prices will therefore increase with
good news events and decrease with bad news events. CDS contracts are different as they relate to 
the likelihood of default. The contract is between two parties and written on an underlying firm 
which is not a party to the contract. The writer of the CDS agrees to a payment in case the 
underlying firm defaults and in return it will receiv  a periodic payment, which is expressed in basis 
points, the CDS spread, of the contracted amount. The likelihood of default by the underlying firm 
determines the size of the CDS spread. The value of the CDS contract will decrease with good news 
and will increase with bad news. Different events can give rise to changes in the expectations about 
the prospects of the firm. However, the valuation by different stakeholders need not be affected 
symmetrically. For instance undertaking a risky project can be beneficial to shareholders due to the 
unlimited upward potential and limited downside risk, and can therefore be positively valued, 
increasing the stock price. Any potential outcome that would lead to bankruptcy will therefore be 
valued equally. The riskiness of the firm will however increase, that in turn increases the likelihood 
of default, which will be negatively valued at each negative value that is possible and lead to an 
increase in the value of the CDS contract. Indeed it is entirely possible, for that reason, that these 
properties would suggest that the share price may go up, but that the CDS price goes up at the same 
time as the increased risk is priced in the CDS and less so in the share price. As a consequence the 
CDS may appear to respond earlier than a share on bad ews. This has to do with the fact that for all 
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potential outcomes where the share price would go bel w zero, remain un-priced as they are all 
priced at zero, while each of these events are pricd for the CDS because the claims will go up with 
ever increasing losses. On the other hand a firm cannot go more bankrupt once they reached that 
state. Indeed, the leading feature of CDS’s is a peculiarity to the instrument; it is not that the market 
for CDS’s sees true while the equity market is not. It is just the case that potential negative 
outcomes keep coming through in the CDS price, irrespective of ‘how’ bankrupt the firm is. On the 
other hand, when there is no likelihood of default, CDS prices are unlikely to respond to changes in 
expected cash flows. In that case stock prices are le ding indicators of CDS’s. That is, it is only 
after a considerable price drop that CDS prices respond to changed conditions. 
 Anecdotal evidence has indicated that for companies that eventually went bankrupt CDS 
spreads appeared to react more quickly to a change in the prospects of the firm, while stock prices 
appeared to remain relatively stable (Bouwens (2009)). The difference in timeliness of reactions to 
news events has received attention in recent literature. The results generally indicate that stock 
prices lead credit risk detection using a firm specific approach (Longstaff et al. (2003), Norden and 
Weber (2009), Forte and Peña (2006, 2009), Forte and Lovreta (2009)). Fung et al (2008) argue that 
idiosyncrasies affect the results of previous studies and therefore they use a portfolio approach by 
looking at the sensitivity of the CDS market index comparing it to the sensitivity of an equally 
weighted stock portfolio of the same firms to the same news events. Their results indicate that for 
the S&P 500 index the stock prices incorporate credit vents in a timely fashion, hence the 
investment-grade CDS index does not appear to contain information leading to credit risk 
discovery. However, the high yield CDS market appears to lead the stock market with respect to 
credit risk discovery, hence for these firms the CDS market can be considered a leading indicator of 
changes in credit risk. 
 In this study I argue that one can expect differences in reactions to news events in both the CDS 
market and stock market. In the investment strategy observable characteristics in either market are 
used to select good news and bad news firms to invest in the other market. The trading strategy is 
tested using a broad sample of European firms for a l nger time period, 2004-2010, by building 
trading portfolios with different durations for each month. The results indicate that the investment 
strategies in both the stock market and the CDS market generate significant positive returns. These 
results indicates that different stakeholders likely focus on different parts of the information set 
dependent on the firm specific situation; hence both stock prices and CDS spreads can be 
informative for the other instrument dependent on the situation. With the trading strategy particular 
groups of firms are selected, therefore I test whether the results can be interpreted as a 
compensation for risk. I show that the portfolio retu ns generated by my trading strategies are not 
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more risky than an investment in market portfolios; therefore it is not likely that risk compensation 
is an explanation for my results. 
 This study contributes to previous literature documenting differences in stock market reactions 
and CDS market reactions in different ways. First I use a cross-sectional approach to test leading 
indicator properties of both the CDS and stock market. Secondly in my study I use a broad sample 
of firms and consider a relatively long time period. Thirdly the results indicate that the differences 
in timeliness of reactions to news exist for a relatively long period, up to 12 months. 
 
4.2 Theoretical motivation and hypotheses 
 The prospects of a firm are of interest to different types of stakeholders. For each firm there is a 
general set of information available which stakeholders use to form expectations about the 
prospects of the firm. In this study I am interested in the use of the general information set by 
different types of stakeholders, whether different stakeholders use value relevant information 
differently. More specifically I focus on two types of stakeholders, namely equity investors and 
CDS contract holders. Both types of investors determine the value of their respective claim by 
focusing on the prospects of the firm. Decisions taken by the firm may affect the probability 
distribution of cash flows differently conditional on the nature of the underlying claim on the firm. 
For instance, while risk taking may affect equity positively it may at the same time impact the 
likelihood of bankruptcy negatively. Previous literature has argued that different stakeholders focus 
on different parts of the information set to value th ir claim. Where debt holders focus more on 
financial statement information (Ball et al. (2008)), other stakeholders, like equity holders, are 
arguably indifferent with respect to the channel through which value relevant information is 
communicated (Easton et al. (2007)). As different stakeholders are likely to use different sources of 
information the valuation of their respective claims can be viewed as a summary statistic of the 
information used. Differences in the timeliness of the respective valuation processes can therefore 
be interpreted as an indication that the same piece of value relevant information is not incorporated 
in the valuation process simultaneously by both groups of stakeholders. 
 The market value of the firm is an indicator of the shareholders expectations as stock prices are 
equal to the discounted cash flows they expect to receive. These expectations of the shareholders 
change overtime, as new information about the prospect  of the firm becomes available.  
 The CDS-contract holders’ expectations about the prospects of the firm are observable as well. 
In this study I focus on Credit Default Swaps (CDS). A CDS is a contract that entitles the holder to 
a payoff in case of default by the underlying company. The benefit of focusing on the value of CDS 
contracts compared to other instruments, like bonds, is that the CDS value does not depend on the 
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specific characteristics of a single loan14. A CDS contract takes the firm as a whole in consideration 
which makes it useful as a proxy for the likelihood that a firm will default on its obligations15. The 
CDS market can basically be interpreted as a market that sells insurance to protect investors against 
the negative consequences of default by the underlying firm. The buyer negotiates with the writer of 
a CDS on an amount to be paid in case of default. The buyer of a CDS is required to pay a periodic 
premium, the CDS spread, as a fee16. The spread for a single CDS contract is fixed. As the CDS 
spread can be interpreted as an insurance premium for the likelihood of default it will depend on the 
credit risk of the underlying firm. As the likelihood of default for a specific firm will change 
overtime CDS spreads will differ dependent on the time the CDS contract is written. As news 
events provide information about the likelihood of default, the CDS spreads will be affected. This 
response will be opposite compared to stock price responses. 
 In case of default by the underlying firm the CDS-contract requires the writer to pay the 
contracted amount to the buyer. Unlike insurance, where contract is written for a specific claim17, 
the CDS can be bought without the buyer holding any other claim in the underlying firm, which is 
known as a naked CDS. The CDS-contract specifies th amount to be paid by the writer in case of 
default. The buyer of the CDS therefore faces the risk if both the underlying firm and the writer of 
the CDS default. To reduce this risk, the writer can be required to collateralize the CDS, which 
means that they are required to setup a separate fund and make regular payments so that the fund 
holds the means for the expected CDS payment. It can also be that the CDS-contract is written by 
multiple parties, this reduces the risk of default of the underlying firm for the individual writing 
parties. Having a CDS written by multiple parties rduces the risk for the buying party as well, as it 
reduces the likelihood that the writer of the CDS will go bankrupt. Furthermore this type of CDS 
tends to be collateralized. 
 Previous literature has provided mixed evidence of the stock market leading the CDS market or 
the CDS market leading the stock market with respect to credit risk detection. Longstaff et al. 
(2003) are not able to draw a definite conclusion of a leading relationship between CDS valuations 
and stock price using weekly data on 68 firms. Norden and Weber (2009) perform an analysis based 
on monthly, weekly and daily data from 58 unique firm observations. Their results indicate that 
                                                            
14 While the market value of a bond reflects the likelihood of default other factors, like maturity, coupon rate and 
convertibility are priced as well. As these factors a e not priced in a CDS contract, CDS spreads are a more direct 
measure of credit risk. 
15 It should be noted that previous literature has indicated that the value of a CDS contract is not solely determined by 
the likelihood of default as market frictions (mainly liquidity) in the CDS market are priced as well. By focusing on the 
most liquid CDS market we have the cleanest measure of the variation in default risk albeit not perfect. 
16 This premium is expressed in basis points and represents the percentage of the principal amount of the CDS contract 
that has to be paid as yearly fee. Commonly every three months a part of the yearly fee will be paid by the buyer of the 
insurance. 
17 At the time of default the insurance contract generally requires the buyer to transfer their claim on the underlying firm 
to the insurer. 
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stock returns lead CDS spread changes, while there is no evidence for the converse relationship. 
Similarly using daily data from a sample of 18 firms originating from the U.S. and Europe, Forte 
and Peña (2006, 2009) show that stock markets leadsCDS markets. Forte and Lovreta (2009) use a 
broader sample of 96 firms around the world to show that stock markets lead CDS markets in most 
cases. However, when credit risk becomes more eminent th  CDS market leads the stock market 
with respect to default risk detection. Most of these studies use the Implied Credit Spread, instead of 
stock returns. The Implied Credit Spread can be intrpreted as a proxy for the incorporation of 
credit risk by the stock market. The measurement of Implied Credit Spread is based on Forte 
(2011), which adapts the structural credit risk model as proposed by Leland and Toft’s (1996) and 
basically captures the difference between the yield on a hypothetical bond (calculated using stock 
market data) and the risk free rate. The findings of these studies relate to firm specific relations 
between CDS spreads and stock returns. Fung et al (2008) use portfolio indices to test whether the 
CDS market or stock market can be interpreted as a leading indicator. They use the CDS index for 
CDS’s with a 5 year maturity as this contract is considered to be the most frequently sold. Therefore 
changes in CDS spreads for this index are indicative of changes in default risk18. On the basis of the 
CDS indices they create equally weighted stock indices, containing the same firms constituting the 
CDS index, to test whether there is co-movement betwe n the two markets and whether one can be 
classified as a leading indicator of credit risks. Their results indicate that for firms belonging to the 
S&P 500 index the stock index leads the CDS market index with respect to credit risk detection. For 
firms with high yield CDS contracts, however, the CDS market index leads the stock market index 
with respect to credit default detection. 
 In a market without arbitrage opportunities, it is not evident that either instrument can generally 
be used as a leading indicator. Previous literature has therefore argued that their results are driven 
by a particular type of firm. Their results predominantly indicate that the stock prices lead credit 
risk detection. In this study I do not argue that the leading indicator properties are specific to a 
single instrument. I argue that dependent on firm specific characteristics the valuation of either 
instrument can be indicative of future changes in the value of the other instrument.  
 In theory the reaction of different stakeholders to the same news events are likely to differ. The 
shareholders of a firm have the option to liquidate th  firm. Due to this option stock prices do not 
exert linear behavior with respect to news events. Hayn (1995) shows that losses are less 
informative for stock prices and that this is likely to be driven by the option that shareholders have 
to liquidate the firm. The value of the shareholders stake can be seen as a call option on the assets of 
the firm, as they are the residual claimants (Black nd Scholes (1973), Merton (1974) and Myers 
                                                            
18 As the CDS spread from the most recent contract is observed on a monthly basis, the frequency of CDS sales is 
important to guarantee the use of the most recent default information. 
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(1977)). Hence if the firm is performing well and the value of the firm is higher than the claim of 
the debt holders, the benefits and costs of changes in the prospects of the firm will flow to the 
shareholders. Conversely if the value of the firm is low the claim debt holders have is more likely to 
be affected by changes in the prospects of the firm. Hence with higher levels of stock prices it can 
be expected that the stock market will react more quickly to news events, while if stock prices are 
lower the reactions to news events are likely to be dampened by the value of the option to liquidate. 
With respect to the CDS market the opposite can be exp cted to be observed. When it is likely that 
a firm is able to meet its obligations, small changes in the prospects are not likely to cause 
significant changes in the default risk; hence the c ange in the CDS value will be limited. This 
situation is similar to the situation where shareholders have the option to liquidate the firm, where 
their response is dampened as well. On the other hand if a firm has difficulties meeting its 
obligations, a change in the prospects is likely to have a significant effect on the default risk, hence 
the CDS value can be expected to change considerably. 
 I argue that dependent on firm specific characteristics there are differences in timeliness of the 
reaction to news events by different stakeholders. Therefore I select firms for which one of the two 
markets can be considered a leading indicator. Using observable characteristics from the CDS 
market I can identify good and bad news firms for which it is likely that the valuation in the CDS 
market can be considered informative for the valuation by the investors in the stock market.  
 
H1: If default risk is more critical the credit default swap market can be used as a leading  
 indicator for stock returns. 
  
 Similarly I select good and bad news firms on the basis of observable characteristics in the 
stock market for which the stock market valuation is likely to be timelier with incorporation of news 
events than the CDS market. Because equity investors have the option to liquidate the firm, 
dampening their reaction to news, it is likely that the stock market reacts in a timelier manner 
compared to the CDS market when the market value of the irm is higher. For these firms I argue 
that the valuation by stock market investors leads credit risk discovery in the CDS market. 
  
H2: If default risk is not imminent the stock market can be used as a leading indicator for changes 
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4.3 Methodology 
 To test my hypothesis that the valuation processes in the CDS and stock market are separated in 
certain situations for particular firms I develop a tr ding strategy that uses observable characteristics 
from either market to select firms for an investment portfolio in the other market. For the trading 
strategy a distinction is made between firms on the basis of news events occurred during the 
previous periods. Three groups of firms, namely good news firms, bad news firms and no news 
firms are identified. For both the good news and banews firms I argue that news events have 
occurred for which it is likely that the valuation in both markets is affected differently. For the no 
news firms, I argue that it is unlikely that the valuation process in the CDS market and the stock 
market is affected differently. The three groups are used to create an investment portfolio which 
does not require an initial investment.  
 For the investment strategies in the stock market th  observable characteristics of the CDS 
market will be used to identify the three groups. The valuation of the CDS contract depends on the 
likelihood of default. However, most CDS contracts have covenants included which implies that the 
valuation reflects the likelihood of technical default as well, which do not provide other 
stakeholders with information regarding the prospects of the firm19. More extreme changes in CDS 
values are likely to reflect changes in the prospects of the firm and arguably should therefore be 
valued by other stakeholders. 
 As the CDS value is related to the likelihood of de ault, good news firms are identified as the 
firms for which default becomes less likely and hence the value of the CDS contract declines. The 
firms are ranked based on the change in CDS premium during the current period. I define firms as 
good news firms if they belong to the bottom 20% of this ranking and the change in CDS spread is 
negative. In a similar fashion I define firms as bad news firms if they belong to the top 20% of this 
ranking and the change in CDS spread is positive. 
 If good news events occur, the CDS value decreases, th  expected prospects of the firm will be 
adjusted upwards leading to an increase in stock price. The trading strategy I propose for these 
firms is to take a long position in the shares which will be financed by a short position in the shares 
of bad and no news firms20. If the investors in the stock market incorporate th  good news events at 
the same time as the investors in the CDS market it is unlikely that I will be able to generate a 
significant positive return using this trading strategy.  
                                                            
19 The underlying firm is not a contracting party forthe CDS contract. Unlike debt covenants, the covenants included in 
CDS contracts only provide an indication about the prospects of the firm, but do not directly impose costs to the 
underlying firm as would be the case with renegotiati n of debt contracts. 
20 I use market value weighting to form my portfolios 
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 If bad news events occur the value of the CDS increases, as the expected prospects of the firm 
are adjusted downward, which in turn should lead to a decline in the valuation of the firm by 
investors in the stock market. For this situation my trading strategy is to take a short position in the
bad news firms and use the money raised to take a long position in the good news and no news 
firms. If the valuation process by investors of theCDS market and investors of the stock market 
reflect the changes in the prospects of the firm at the same time this trading strategy should not 
generate a significant positive return.  
 Specific companies are selected to form the trading portfolio. Previous literature has argued 
that leading indicator variable properties are argubly related to the riskiness of the specific 
companies selected, which likely differs from an investment in the market portfolio. Therefore I 
create investment portfolios where all firm observations in a specific period are randomly assigned 
a long and a short position. This random portfolio requires no initial investment and provides a 
benchmark to which the riskiness of my trading portfolios can be compared. For each month 20 
random portfolios are generated, hence a total of 1,380 random portfolios. 
 For the investment strategies in the CDS market the characteristics of the stock market are used 
to identify good-, bad- and no news firm categories. To classify the firms, firms are ranked 
according to their stock returns. For the classification of the firms again I focus on the extremes of 
this distribution. I define firms as good news firms if they belong to the top 20% of this ranking and 
the stock return is positive. In a similar fashion I define firms as bad news firms if they belong to 
the bottom 20% of this ranking and the stock return is egative. 
 If good news occurs, indicated by a high stock return, the expectations about the prospects of 
the firm are likely to be updated upwards, and CDS values will decline as the likelihood of default 
decreases. The trading strategy used for the CDS market is therefore to take a short position in the 
good news firms and a long position in the bad news and no news firms21. If the information in both 
the stock market and CDS market is incorporated at the same time this investment strategy is not 
expected to generate a significant positive return. If bad news occurs, indicated by a low stock 
return, it is likely that the expectations about the prospects are adjusted downwards, leading to an 
increase in CDS values as the likelihood of default will increase. Therefore the trading strategy 
holds a long position in the CDS market for bad news firms which will be financed by a short 
position in the good news and no news firms.  
 Besides looking at the return of the trading strategies the differences in the distribution of 
returns of the trading strategies are compared to the returns generated by a portfolio where firms are 
                                                            
21 Note that I will use a weighting for each firm based on the CDS values in these strategies. 
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randomly selected for a long and short position. This approach allows me to test whether the 
differences in returns are driven by differences in riskiness of the investment strategies. 
 
4.4 Data selection 
 I use Datastream to collect CDS spreads and stock pri es and I focus on European countries. 
The coverage of CDS values by Datastream starts at the end of 2003, for most firms at the 
beginning of 2004. Therefore I have collected data for the period 2004 until 2010. In this study I use 
the 5-year collateralized CDS contracts, as this the contract duration is most frequently used and for 
which the market is most liquid (Fung et al (2008))22. However, CDS quotes are not available for 
every firm and a manual match needs to be created in order to combine the CDS with stock price 
data. The final sample consists of 7,874 monthly observations relating to 113 firms. Due to data 
requirements for the portfolio building the sample used for the analysis consists out of 6,236 
monthly observations for 98 unique firms.  
 In table 4.1 some descriptive statistics for the different groups for our trading portfolios are 
provided. On the basis of these descriptives it can be concluded that when I use CDS characteristics 
to identify bad news firms I am indeed selecting the firms which have higher CDS spreads and 
lower levels of stock prices. Hence I identify firms for which the CDS market is likely to be more 
sensitive to news events than the stock market. For the investment portfolios created on the basis of 
the stock returns a similar pattern cannot be observed, as the CDS spreads are significantly higher, 
compared to the group of firms identified as no news firms. 
 
 




                                                          
22 By using the most liquid CDS market the effects of CDS market liquidity in the pricing of CDS contracts are 
minimized and hence this is the cleanest measure of d fault risk. Furthermore if the CDS contract is collateralized the 
default risk of the CDS writer is not priced. 




 To test my hypotheses I will use the trading strategies described in section 3. First I test the 
leading indicator properties of the CDS market to test hypothesis 1a. Secondly I test the leading 
indicator properties of the stock market, related to hypothesis 1b. I perform additional analysis, 
described in the final section of this paragraph, were I test for momentum in both the CDS and 
stock market and I also test a different specification of bad news firms based on CDS market 
characteristics. 
 
4.5.1 Leading indicator properties of the CDS market 
 To test the leading indicator properties of CDS contract valuations I use the trading strategies 
for bad news and good news firms. The bad news trading strategy is to take a short position in the 
bad news firms and a long position in the good news and other firms. The good news trading 
strategy is to take a long position in the good news firms and a short position in the bad news and 
other firms. I am able to build a trading portfolio using our strategy for 67 and 69 months. 
Portfolios with different lengths are created. The results, presented in table 4.2, indicate that the bad 
news portfolio is not able to generate significant positive returns. The return for the bad news 
investment portfolio with an 11 month holding period generates a marginally significant negative 
return. This result is not expected as it indicates that the firms identified as bad news firms based on 
CDS market characteristics actually appear to recovr23. The results for the good news portfolios 
based on CDS market characteristics indicate that the CDS market is a leading indicator for the 
stock market. The CDS market can be considered a leading indicator for the stock market for a 
relatively long leading period of 3 to 18 months. 
 
                                                            
23 Given the sample selection this result can be explained due to survivorship bias. While I do not require a matched 
sample, the same companies are in the sample for most periods. 
66 Firm decisions and market responses: Three accounting essays 
 
Table 4.2: Returns for investment portfolios with different durations, where firms are  
selected based on CDS market characteristics. 
 
 An explanation for these returns on the portfolios can be the riskiness of the investment as I am 
selecting specific companies; firms that are arguably close to default and firms for which the future 
prospects might be uncertain. For the portfolio it might be that the difference in returns observed is 
a compensation for the riskiness of the investment. Therefore I compare the distributions of the 
returns for both the investment in the market and the investment in our portfolio. In figure 4.1 the 
cumulative density functions for my trading portfolios in the stock market based on CDS 
characteristics is plotted, the cumulative density function of my bad news and good news portfolio 




                                                            
24 The cumulative density functions for the different holding periods look qualitatively the same. 




Figure 4.1: Cumulative density function for the investment in the stock market  
based on CDS market characteristics, with a duration of 12 months. 
 
This figure indicates that the good news portfolio is first order stochastically dominant with respect 
to the results it generates, although the differences are small. This is interpreted as an indication that 
the portfolio returns are not driven by the riskiness of our investment portfolios.  
 
4.5.2 Leading indicator properties of the stock market 
 Similar to the analysis for the CDS market I use trading strategies for bad news and good news 
firms to test the leading indicator properties of the stock market. The bad news trading strategy is to 
take a long position in the bad news firms and a short position in the good news and other firms. 
The good news trading strategy is to take a short psition in the good news firms and a long 
position in the bad news and other firms. I am able to build a trading portfolio using our strategy for
69 and 68 months. Similarly to the CDS market analysis portfolios with different duration are 
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Table 4.3: Returns for investment portfolios with different durations, where firms are  
selected based on stock market characteristics. 
 
The portfolio returns for the firms which I identify as bad news firms are significantly positive and 
significantly different from a portfolio where I randomly invest in the CDS market. This holds for 
the portfolio returns with a long holding period of 12, 13 and 14 months, which indicates that the 
stock market can be considered a leading indicator for these firms with a long leading period of at 
least 12 months. However, for the good news portfolio I am not able to document a significant 
return for the selected firms.  
 Again an explanation for these returns on the portfolios can again be the riskiness of the 
investment as I am selecting specific companies. Similar to the investment strategies based on CDS 
market characteristics I compare the distributions f the returns for both the investment in the 
market and the investment in our portfolio. In figures 4.2 and 4.3 the cumulative density functions 
are depicted for the trading portfolios in the CDS market based on the stock market characteristics.  
 




Figure 4.2: Cumulative density function for the investment in the CDS market  
based on stock market characteristics, with a duration of 12 months. 
 
In figure 4.2 the cumulative density functions for the good news, bad news and random portfolio in 
the CDS market with 12 month duration is depicted. While the differences in the density functions 
appear to be small, the bad news portfolio appears to be first order stochastically dominant to the 
random portfolio. This can be interpreted as an indication that the significant portfolio returns are 
not a compensation for risk. In figure 4.3 the cumulative density functions for the portfolios with 18
month duration are plotted. This figure indicates that the good news and bad news portfolio in the 
lower tail are above the cumulative density function of the random portfolio, indicating that these 
trading strategies are more risky. While in the upper tail the bad news portfolio is below the random 
portfolio, indicating less risk. Overall the result indicate that the stock market is a leading indicator 
for the CDS market with a long lead time of 12 to 14 months, while this cannot be considered a 




                                                          
25 The cumulative density functions for the other holding periods show that for shorter holding periods there is no 
significant difference in the tails of the distribution, while for longer holding periods there appears to be more lower tail 
risk, while there appears to be less upper tail risk, similar to figure 3. 
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative density function for the investment in the CDS market  
based on stock market characteristics, with a duration of 18 months. 
 
4.5.3 Additional Analyses 
 In order to rule out that the portfolio returns I generate are driven by momentum in both CDS 
spreads and stock prices I perform additional analyses. For the firms selected for my trading 
portfolio on the basis of stock characteristics an investment in the stock market is made. These 
portfolios do not yield significantly positive returns, as can be seen in table 4.3. Similarly for the 
firms selected on the basis of CDS market characteristics an investment in the CDS market is made. 
As can be seen in table 4.2 for both the bad news and good news portfolios of firms this investment 
strategy generates a marginally significantly positive return and the periods for which momentum 
might be identified does not appear to be related with the periods for which the CDS market is 
considered to be a leading indicator for the stock market. 
 In table 4.4 the regressions of CDS spreads, changes in CDS spread, stock prices and stock 
returns are depicted. In column 1 the dependent variable is the CDS spread one period ahead, 
CDSi,1, and the independent variable is the current CDS spread, CDSi,0 where the investment 
strategy is based upon.  
 
 




Table 4.4: Relation between current and future CDS spreads,  
CDS spread changes, Stock prices and Stock returns. 
 
 The results indicate that CDS spreads appear to besticky over time, with a coefficient close to 
1. Similar results hold for the stock prices, depicted in column 3 of table 4. These results indicate 
that both the CDS spreads and stock prices are relatively stable over time. In columns 2 and 4 of 
table 4.4 the changes in the value of both instruments over time are depicted. In column 2 the 
relation between the future change in CDS spread, (CDSi,1 – CDSi,0) is the dependent variable and 
the independent variable is the current change in CDS spread (CDSi,0- CDSi,-1). The coefficient is 
positive, but close to zero, which indicates that there is a small positive drift in CDS spread 
changes. For stock returns there is no significant relation between current period returns and future 
returns. The results from these two columns indicate that changes in the instrument value are not 
likely to reverse themselves. Overall these results are in line with the main results that a change in 
either instrument is based on value relevant information and that dependent on firm characteristics 
the information is not taken into account in the valuation of the other instrument. 
 For the different news groups there are differences with respect to the contemporaneous 
changes in the value of both instruments. In table 4.5 the correlations between the portfolio returns 
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in the period used for classification of the firms are depicted. If the CDS market characteristics are 
used for the classification of the firms, there is a trong contemporaneous movement in the values 
of both instruments for the firms that are classified as bad news firms.  
 
 
Table 4.5: Contemporaneous relation between  
the CDS market and the stock market 
 
 This result explains the results of the main analysis; where there is no support for the 
hypothesis that bad news in the CDS market can be considered a leading indicator for the stock 
market. As the contemporaneous correlation is high, it is likely that in the valuation process of both 
instruments the value relevant information is incorporated simultaneously. For the other portfolios 
there is no indication that there is a contemporaneous movement in the values of both instruments. 
For good news in the CDS market, the results are consistent with H1. 
 As the likelihood of significant portfolio returns increases with the return of the portfolio, the 
sensitivity of both the CDS market and the stock market are important. Hayn (1995) indicates that 
stock prices react less if the market value of the firm is lower. I expect the CDS market to exert 
similar behavior, but in an opposite way. Therefore th  selection criteria for the bad news firms as 
selected on the basis of CDS market characteristics are changed. First a minimum level of CDS 
contract value is required, by focusing on the top 20% of CDS values. Secondly a focus on the firms 
for which the stock market is less sensitive to news, by focusing on the bottom 25% of stock prices. 
And increasing CDS values are required to ensure that the credit risk has increased during the 
period. For these firms the descriptive statistics are depicted in table 4.6.  




Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics, with the alternative definition of bad news  
based on CDS market characteristics. 
 
Firms identified as bad news firms have significantly higher CDS spreads and significantly lower 
stock prices. For these firms the trading portfolios are built in a similar fashion as for the other 
groups. In table 4.7 the results of the trading portfolios are depicted. The trading portfolios based on 
bad news firms with duration of 3, 4 or 5 months generate a significant positive return, indicating 
that the CDS market is a leading indicator for bad news firms as well. Similarly as for the other 
classifications, momentum in the CDS market does not appear to be present. 
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Table 4.7: Returns for investment portfolios with different durations, where firms are  
selected based on CDS market characteristics. (Alternative Bad news specification) 
 
The cumulative density frequency plot, figure 4.4, for this bad news portfolio does not differ 
significantly from the random portfolio hence the results do not seem to be a compensation for the 
riskiness of the investment. 
 




Figure 4.4: Cumulative density function for the investment in the stock market  
based on CDS market characteristics, with a duration of 4 months. 
  
4.6 Conclusions 
 In this study I hypothesize that there is a systematic difference in the way in which news is 
incorporated in stock prices and CDS values. Therefore I argue that both instruments can be 
considered informative for the other instrument based on firm specific characteristics. The results 
from my analysis indicate that during a 67 month period I am able to systematically use the CDS 
values to select firms for an investment portfolio which generates a significantly higher return, than 
the market portfolio but is not riskier than the market portfolio. The lead time for this portfolio 
ranges from 3 to 18 months. The results also indicate that stock prices during a 69 month period can 
be used to generate significant positive returns in the CDS market. The lead time for the stock 
market is relatively long with 12 to 14 months. As my trading portfolios are not riskier than an 
investment in a random market portfolio, the significant positive returns cannot be interpreted as a 
compensation for risk. Furthermore additional analyses indicate that it is unlikely that my results are
driven by momentum in either the CDS or the stock market. 
 These findings contribute to the literature as they indicate that equity valuations and debt 
valuations incorporate news in a dissimilar fashion. Previous literature has generally indicated that 
Implied Credit Spreads lead CDS spreads. While in th s study I show that either market can be 
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considered to be a leading indicator for the other ma ket. The findings in this study contribute to the
literature as well by indicating that the lead period for either market is much longer than has been 
identified by previous studies. Furthermore my study is the first to use firm specific CDS spreads 
and Stock returns for a broad sample of 98 firms to sh w a systematic relation between CDS 
spreads and stock returns over a longer time period, with portfolio holdings up to 18 months. 
 This study also creates opportunities for future research as it is important to gain a better 
understanding of where the differences in valuation processes arise from. And more importantly 
how accounting information can help shareholders benefit from the CDS valuations. 
 An important limitation of this study is data availability. On the one hand there are limitations 
with respect to the time series available for analysis. Future extensions can cover longer time 
horizons and probably less economically turbulent periods. On the other hand there are limitations 
with respect to the cross section of firms, data avil bility drives the focus towards bigger and older 
firms, and hence a survivorship bias is likely to be present. This survivorship bias arguably is most 
likely to affect the investment strategy based on CDS characteristics, more specifically the bad 
news investment strategy. The bad news strategy requires a short position in the stock market, 
however if due to the survivorship bias firms that ac ually go bankrupt are not in the sample, the 
opportunities for short positions is limited. It should be noted though that this probably works 
against finding results. For the good news strategy survivorship bias is less likely to affect the 
results as these are firms for which there is already an upturn in the prospects. Future work might 
benefit from even a broader cross section of firms thereby increasing the applicability of these 
findings in practice.  
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